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Sex education, state policy and the
principle of mutual consent
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Vrije University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Constitutive of the prevalent sexual morality in most Western European countries is the liberal
principle of mutual consent (PMC). This sociological fact may give rise to the ethical question as
to whether or not the state has the right to make sure that its citizens will observe PMC, among
other ways by prescribing some form of sex education which has PMC as its moral content. With
reference to the ambiguity of the term ‘morally permissible’, it is argued that PMC can be
interpreted in two fundamentally different ways, namely, as the freedom to arrange one’s sexual
life according to one’s own values and preferences (PMC(a)) or as the view that consensual sex
is morally all right or morally unobjectionable (PMC(b)). The claim is defended that PMC(a)
should be taken as part of the public morality, whereas PMC(b) should be seen as a private
morality. Accordingly, the state has the right to take PMC(a) as a basis for its educational policy,
but the state is not allowed to prescribe any form of sex education that has PMC(b) as its moral
content. The importance of the distinction between PMC(a) and PMC(b) is shown by giving an
evaluation of the Dutch state’s responses to recent public statements of orthodox religious leaders
about the moral status of homosexuality. Also on the basis of this distinction, the central
differences between liberal orthodox and fundamentalist orthodox religious views on sexuality
and the role of the state are pointed out. In this connection, it is argued that any view which
takes PMC(b) as part of the public morality should be disavowed as a kind of ‘liberal funda-
mentalism’.
The problem
Nearly all publications on sex and education—whether scientific papers or policy
documents, philosophical books or newspaper articles—more or less implicitly
support the view that some form of sex education is needed for all children. Apart
from this basic but rather trivial consensus, however, almost any claim about sex
education is under discussion. As may be deduced from the many publications on
this subject, matters of great controversy are, in particular, the question as to which
form or content sex education should have, as well as the related question as to who
should have the right or authority to determine the form or content of this field of
education—parents, teachers, the community, the state, or some or all of them to a
certain extent? Our intention is to contribute to this ongoing debate by trying to
determine whether or not the state has the right to prescribe how its future citizens
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50 J. Steutel & B. Spiecker
should be sexually educated, and, if so, in which respects. But before embarking on
this project, we want to make two preliminary remarks.
First a specification. In talking about the authority of the state with regard to sex
education, we will only refer to forms of sex education that are intended to promote
the moral growth of the child, in particular by cultivating certain moral attitudes or
inculcating certain moral principles. Forms of sex education could be defended that
are intended to be morally neutral, like informing the child about biological and
medical facts of sex and reproduction, without any moral comment or evaluation, or
imparting information about different moral views with regard to forms of sexual
behaviour, without taking any stance towards them. However, the kind of sex
education that we want to discuss is taken as a part of moral education: its aim is to
stimulate the growth of the child into a person who will do the right things for the
right reasons in matters of sexuality. Accordingly, our central question should be
read as follows: Does the state have the authority to prescribe for all its future
citizens a form of sex education with a particular moral content?
Next a clarification. If we claim that the state has the authority to prescribe such
a type of sex education, we presuppose that its moral content can rightly be regarded
as part of the so-called public morality. The terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ are used in
different ways, not only in common parlance but also in the domain of political
philosophy. In this context, we shall define these twin concepts as follows. A public
morality consists of principles and virtues which may be defended and promoted by
the state wherever and whenever deemed necessary. That is, the state has the right
to see to it that these principles are observed, to encourage that these virtues are
cultivated and practised, as well as to oppose any view or doctrine that is inconsist-
ent with these principles or virtues. In contradiction to a public morality, a private
morality is composed of principles and virtues which on no account may be
defended or favoured by the state. Moreover, as long as these moralities stay within
the limits of the public morality, the state is not allowed to oppose them, neither by
discouraging (nor preventing) its citizens from living up to these principles or
cultivating and practising these virtues, nor by criticizing or attacking the doctrines
in which these principles and virtues are explained and justified. Given this distinc-
tion between the public and the private, our central question can be answered in the
affirmative only if there is such a thing as a public sexual morality. If we consider all
forms of sexual morality to be private, we necessarily assume that the state does not
have the right to promote or favour such a kind of morality, neither by introducing
coercive measures or holding out the prospects of rewards, nor by taking steps to
ensure that the relevant moral concerns are inculcated or cultivated. In other words,
the answer to our central question is dependent on our answer to a more basic
question: Is it possible to point out any principles or virtues regarding the sexual
sphere that should be taken as elements of the public morality?
The principle of mutual consent
During the last four decades or so, moral views about sexuality have changed





































































Sex education and state policy 51
as the 1960s, marriage and procreation were generally taken as the principal criteria
of permissible sexual behaviour. Nowadays the prevailing practice appears to be to
appraise sexual conduct on the basis of typical liberal values, more specifically on the
basis of the liberal principle of mutual consent. The dominant view seems to be that
any kind of sexual practice is morally permissible, including sex before marriage and
sex without any possibility of reproduction, as long as the persons involved have
given their consent and no significant harm is done to third parties.
Although the principle of mutual consent is widely endorsed nowadays, albeit
often implicitly, its interpretation and application are far from unproblematic (cf.
Soble, 1996; Archard, 1998; Primoratz, 1999). One major problem is how exactly
the notion of consent should be interpreted. It will be clear that not every instance
of consent will be valid. For example, the fact that someone has consented to have
sex under serious threat or severe pressure can hardly be taken as a good reason for
considering the sex morally legitimate. But what exactly are the conditions which
validate the consent of a person? The view that is generally defended by liberal
philosophers, and which also seems to be widely but much less reflectively held in
most Western European countries, is that valid consent is freely given, on the basis
of relevant and appropriate information, by someone with mature powers of judge-
ment. Correspondingly, the conditions which are regarded as invalidating an act of
consent are coercion and fraud, as well as underdeveloped capacities of deliberation.
However, on the question of how these validating and invalidating conditions
themselves should be interpreted, opinions are beginning to diverge, not only in
philosophical circles but also in liberal societies at large. Take, for example, the
notion of coercion and the corresponding notion of voluntariness. Some adherents
of the principle of mutual consent, in particular those who call themselves libertar-
ians, are inclined to define the notion of coercion rather restrictively, in such a
manner that only serious threats, such as threats of death or the infliction of bodily
injury or grave economic harm, are coercive to a degree which makes consent
involuntary and therefore invalid (cf. Belliotti, 1993, pp. 89, 195–196). Others, in
particular radical feminists, tend to define the notion of coercion so broadly that
whenever a woman has sex with a man for some extrinsic reason, and not out of her
own genuine affection and desire, she is coerced and therefore raped (cf. Soble,
1998, pp. 75–76). Moreover, even if on a rather abstract or general level some fairly
broad consensus exists about how the conditions of valid consent should be
interpreted, the application of the principle of mutual consent to concrete cases may
still give rise to heated discussions. For example, the deliberative capacities required
for valid consent are commonly regarded as precisely those powers of judgement
that are constitutive of moral agency, and, consequently, as conditions in the
absence of which someone cannot be held fully morally responsible. Notwithstand-
ing this broad consensus, however, opinions greatly differ about whether or not
people with mild or moderate mental retardation are to be conceived as (full-blown)
moral agents and therefore capable of giving valid consent to forms of sexual
interaction (Leicester & Cooke, 2002; Spiecker & Steutel, 2002; Steutel & Spiecker,
2002). And contrary to the moral and psychological views which form the basis of





































































52 J. Steutel & B. Spiecker
that the deliberative capacities of pre-pubescent children are generally underesti-
mated, as a consequence of which many of them are mistakenly denied the status of
moral agency, at least with regard to sexual behaviour.
Disagreement about interpretation and application of the principle of mutual
consent obviously does not exclude agreement about the principle itself. Every moral
principle will be explained and applied in different and often incompatible ways, but
it would be wrong to conclude from this that actually different or even incompatible
principles are endorsed. On the contrary, one cannot discuss or disagree about the
interpretation or application of a principle without presupposing that the very same
principle is involved. So claiming that the principle of mutual consent is currently
supported by a large majority in many Western European countries is quite compat-
ible with acknowledging the fact that within that majority its interpretation and
application is far from uncontroversial.
To illustrate the sociological fact that at least in the Netherlands the principle of
mutual consent is nowadays the cornerstone of the prevalent sexual morality,
reference could be made to the often strongly aversive reactions of leading politi-
cians, well-organized pressure groups and quality newspapers to recent public
statements of several leaders of orthodox religious groups about the moral status of
homosexuality. According to the liberal principle of mutual consent, sex between
individuals of the same sex is morally permissible as long as the persons concerned
have given their valid consent and no serious harm is done to third parties. However,
several representatives of both orthodox Christian groups (like minister E. Herbig
from the Pentecostal church at Hengeloo) and certain Muslim communities (like
imam Khalil el-Moumni from Rotterdam) recently declared that homosexual activ-
ities are in themselves morally unacceptable. To express their religiously based
disapproval, they use terms like ‘impudent’, ‘scandalous’, ‘disgraceful’, ‘immoral’,
‘utterly forbidden’, ‘very bad’, ‘intolerable’, ‘a profanity’ and ‘a filthy sin’. In a recent
radio interview a self-declared spokesman of Muslims in the Netherlands (imam
Abdullah Haselhoef) even proclaimed that capital punishment of practising homo-
sexuals should be a legal possibility. These morally depreciative statements regard-
ing homosexuality have caused a storm of indignation in Dutch society. Immediately
after the public statements of minister Herbig and imam El-Moumni, the Public
Prosecutor started to examine the possibility of prosecuting them for deliberate
insult, incitation to hatred or discrimination. A few days later, the former Dutch
Minister of Integration Policy (Roger van Boxtel) sent an invitation to a representa-
tive delegation of the 300 imams who are working in the Netherlands in order to
discuss their moral views about homosexuality, to make it clear to them that in
Dutch society different norms obtain, as well as to encourage them to honour the
values of respect and tolerance.
The fact that the Prosecution Counsel and a member of the Cabinet felt called to
oppose orthodox religious views on homosexuality may be taken as an indication
that the liberal sexual morality of mutual consent is more or less implicitly accepted
as a public morality. The very same view, but now quite explicitly, is defended by
David Archard in his recently published essay Sex Education (2000). Archard tries to





































































Sex education and state policy 53
education. One of his conclusions is that the state has both the authority and
responsibility to make sure that all young people will receive a kind of sex education
that has the principle of mutual consent as its moral content (Archard, 2000,
pp. 41–42).
Is this view tenable? Should the liberal principle of mutual consent indeed be
regarded as part of the public morality, that is, as a sexual morality that may be
defended and promoted by the state whenever and wherever deemed to be neces-
sary? And why would the state act wrongly if it would take the indicated orthodox
religious views on homosexuality as a basis of its policy and legislation? To concen-
trate on sex education: Why should the state have the right to make arrangements
to ensure that the younger generation will grow into citizens who are intrinsically
committed to the principle of mutual consent? And given that the state’s authority
in these matters is the supreme authority, how, then, could it be justified to orthodox
religious parents that they ought to obey the state’s prescription that their children
should attend schools in which the principle of mutual consent is transmitted?
Two interpretations of ‘morally permissible’
In our view, these and related questions cannot be answered properly without
making a distinction between two quite different interpretations of the principle of
mutual consent. In the recent public debate on homosexuality that was generated by
orthodox religious authorities, the distinction we have in mind is nowhere intro-
duced in any explicit or systematic way. On the contrary, the distinction seems to be
completely ignored or overlooked, and does not even seem to be part of the
conceptual scheme of the participants in the debate. Nonetheless, we think that
introducing and explaining the distinction is crucial for developing a well-justified
view on legitimate state influence on sex education and therefore also for preventing
serious moral derailments of state policy.
As we have seen, the principle of mutual consent lays down the conditions under
which sexual activities are morally permissible: anything sexual is morally permis-
sible as long as it is done with the valid consent of the participants (and does not
harm anyone else—but we will not repeat this addition anymore). However, the
term ‘morally permissible’ (and also the terms that are often taken as its synonyms,
like ‘morally acceptable’, ‘morally legitimate’ and ‘morally allowed’) is ambiguous.
Sometimes, when we say that a certain kind of action is morally permissible, we
mean that individuals have a moral right to perform that kind of action. But we can
also use the same term in an importantly different way, namely, to express the view
that a certain kind of action is not morally wrong or not morally undesirable. Often,
when we believe that persons have the right to do particular things, we also believe
that doing these things is neither morally wrong nor morally undesirable—but
definitely not always. Sometimes we sincerely believe that people have a moral right
to do certain things, while also holding the view that doing such things can be open
to serious moral objections. To put it differently, our conviction that persons should
be assigned certain rights may go hand in hand with the conviction that the way in





































































54 J. Steutel & B. Spiecker
or degrading. For example, as true democrats we strongly believe that every citizen
should have the right to vote. But this firm conviction does not exclude our moral
disapproval of giving one’s vote to a political party with a morally repugnant
manifesto. And we may acknowledge that some of our fellow citizens publicly
express and defend views that are morally reprehensible or even pernicious, and at
the same time firmly believe that they should have the right to do so. In other words,
dependent on the meaning of ‘morally permissible’, the principle of mutual consent
can be interpreted in two different ways, namely, as laying down (a) that human
beings have the moral right to have the kind of sex they prefer or value if, and only
if, all the parties have given their valid consent, and (b) that having a particular kind
of sex is neither morally wrong nor morally undesirable if, and only if, the persons
involved are validly consenting. For the sake of convenience we shall call these two
interpretations of the principle of mutual consent PMC(a) and PMC(b).
It will be clear that the moral right laid down by PMC(a) is not a welfare right but
a freedom right or a right of self-determination. A welfare right is one which entails a
positive duty, that is, a duty of others to do certain things, in this case the duty to
provide or maintain certain benefits, or, more generally, to assist the right-holder in
doing or getting the things the right refers to. But a freedom right merely entails a
negative duty, that is, a duty of others not to do certain things, in this case the duty
not to interfere with, impede or render impossible the action or practice to which the
person is said to have a right. Moreover, a precondition for having welfare rights is
having interests which can be preserved, protected or promoted, whereas a precon-
dition for having freedom rights is having the mental equipment for exercising those
rights, in particular the deliberative powers that are constitutive of moral agency.
Though the sexual right we are discussing is a right of freedom, it is also possible to
defend sexual welfare rights, for example the right of handicapped persons to get
financial support for buying sexual services.
Given the plausibility of the distinction made, we want to defend the claim that
PMC(a) should be taken as a public sexual morality, whereas PMC(b) should
function as a private morality only. On the basis of this claim it can be argued that
the state has the authority to see to it that its future citizens will get a form of sex
education in which they learn to respect the right of their fellow citizens to be
involved in sexual activities which have the valid consent of all the participants. But
the state does not have the authority to teach its future citizens the view that any
form of sex which is validly consented to by all the parties concerned is morally
unobjectionable, let alone that all such sexual practices are perfectly sound. In other
words, the state has the right to make sure that its future citizens will get some form
of sex education that is based on PMC(a), but the state would act wrongly if it
would base its policy regarding sex education on PMC(b). These two forms of
liberal sex education we shall call LSE(a) and LSE(b) henceforth.
If we apply the distinctions made to the recent public debate on homosexuality,
the following observations could be made. First, part of the public morality is the
moral right of any citizen to take part in consensual sexual interaction between
persons of the same sex. Consequently, the state should promote this view, es-





































































Sex education and state policy 55
right. Moreover, the state has the right to oppose any kind of morality which is
contrary to the indicated public morality regarding homosexuality. If, for example,
orthodox religious believers maintain that homosexual practices are intolerable, or
should be forbidden by legal regulations, or ought to be punished by the legal
authorities, they are propagating a moral view which may be criticized and attacked
by the state. Second, the view that consensual homosexual practices are neither
morally wrong nor morally undesirable should be seen as a private morality.
Consequently, the state is not allowed to promote this view, let alone to encourage
homosexuals with a different moral view to act in accordance with their sexual
orientation. Nor has the state the right to oppose a moral view simply because it
condemns any form of sexual interaction between persons of the same sex. For
example, if orthodox Christians or Muslims argue that homosexual behaviour is
disgraceful, immoral or vicious, without denying that persons have the moral right
to be engaged in consensual homosexual interaction, they are defending a moral
view which should be respected by the state.
A justification
So our answer to the question we raised at the beginning of our paper is that the
state is allowed to prescribe LSE(a) but not LSE(b). To put it differently, the state
has the right to make sure that all its future citizens will receive a form of sex
education that has PMC(a) but not PMC(b) as its moral content. But how could
this claim be justified?
One promising way to do that is by showing that PMC(a) is implied by the basic
rights that are part and parcel of a liberal democracy. Characteristic of liberal-demo-
cratic political communities, including the Western European countries, is that
citizens are assigned certain basic rights and that the state has both the authority and
responsibility to ensure that those rights are not violated but respected. The basic
individual rights we have in mind here are roughly those that are covered by John
Rawls’s first principle of justice. This principle, which is also called the principle of
greatest equal liberty, is summarized by Rawls in the following way: ‘Each person
has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties,
which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all’ (1993, p. 5). The main
tenor of this principle is to give every adult member of society an optimal package
or the most extensive total system of the same basic rights and liberties. The central
components of this package are the well-known civic liberties (like liberty of
conscience and the freedom of speech), the political-democratic rights (like the right
to vote and the right to run for public office), and also the fundamental rights that
are covered by the so-called rule of law (like the right of legal due process or the right
to impartial treatment in court).
Of particular importance in the context of our argument are the basic civic
liberties, especially the fundamental liberty of all citizens to arrange their lives
according to their own conception of the good, including their own moral and
metaphysical views. In the written constitutions of the different Western European





































































56 J. Steutel & B. Spiecker
constitution it is called ‘freedom of religion and philosophy of life’ (Art. 6: Vrijheid
van godsdienst en levensovertuiging), but it is often also called ‘freedom of thought’ or
‘freedom of conscience’. But however differently it may be formulated, its central
function is the same: it is designed to protect the freedom of all citizens to lead their
lives from the inside, that is, in accordance with their own beliefs about what gives
value to life or about which things are important or worth striving for (Kymlicka,
1989, pp. 10–13). Obviously this basic right of self-determination is not an unre-
stricted right. In a liberal democracy citizens are regarded not only as free but also
as equal. That’s why the civic liberties are assigned to all citizens, whatever their
conception of the good or their world view. Consequently, any citizen’s right of
self-determination is restricted by the overriding principle of respecting the equal
basic freedom of all fellow citizens. Everyone is allowed to arrange one’s life
according to one’s own views, but only insofar as one’s way of living does not violate
the right of others to live according to their views.
It is this basic liberal right of self-determination which implies PMC(a) or,
perhaps more properly stated, PMC(a) should be regarded as a specification of this
central civic liberty. The right of self-determination, as laid down in the constitu-
tions of liberal democracies, should be taken as a general right in the sense that it
covers our entire life, including its sexual aspects. Thus, if citizens have the general
civic liberty to arrange their lives according to their own values and preferences, they
also have the more specific liberty to arrange their sexual lives according to their own
values and preferences. And just like the general right of self-determination, the
sexual right of self-determination is not unrestricted. It is limited to sexual practices
which do not cross the borders of other people’s rights to determine how to arrange
their sexual lives. Precisely these limiting conditions are specified in PMC(a): the
requirement of valid consent is tantamount to the requirement to respect the right
of sexual self-determination of all the parties concerned.
To sum up, then, our justification presents the claim that the state has the right
to prescribe LSE(a) as a conclusion that can be deduced from the premise that the
state has the authority to make sure that each citizen’s basic right of self-determi-
nation is not violated but respected, and the premise that this general right implies
the more specific right of sexual self-determination. If we are not mistaken, there are
only three possible ways to rebut our justification. The first one is to attack the
second premise by denying that the right of sexual self-determination is implied by
the basic civic liberty that is constitutive of a liberal democracy. It is doubtful,
however, whether such an attack could be backed up by plausible reasons. On pain
of being arbitrary, reasons should be given not only for denying or restricting the
sexual freedom of citizens, but also for approaching the sexual sphere, compared
with the non-sexual aspects of human life, in such a fundamentally different way.
But what on earth could make human sexuality so special that it should be excluded
from the freedom granted to all other spheres of human life? A second way of
contesting our justification consists of attacking the first premise. What is dismissed
now is not the claim that sexual freedom is implied by the general right of
self-determination, but the claim that the state has the authority to make sure that





































































Sex education and state policy 57
right of self-determination is a cornerstone of any liberal democracy, this rebuttal
has the rather unattractive implication that the liberal state may be replaced by an
oppressive regime. A final way of criticising our justification consists in denying that
the conclusion can be deduced from the premises, in particular by maintaining that
the authority of the state to prevent any infringement of the right of sexual
self-determination (PMC(a)) does not give the state the authority to prescribe a
form of sex education with a moral content that is composed of the indicated sexual
right and the corresponding duty (LSE(a)). We do not think, however, that this
form of criticism is warranted. Giving the state the right to ensure that citizens will
observe PMC(a) implies giving the state the right to take steps that are required to
achieve that aim. Obviously one of those steps is to promote and sustain citizens’
extrinsic motivations for complying with PMC(a), especially by controlling them
and threatening them with sanctions. But taking such measures is definitely not
enough to make sure that citizens will observe PMC(a). What is also needed is to
stimulate citizens’ intrinsic motivations for keeping PMC(a), especially by teaching
them the relevant moral concerns and commitments.
A typology
Thus far we have offered a justification of the claim that the state should have the
right to prescribe LSE(a). But we have still not shown why the state does not have
the authority to prescribe LSE(b). Why would the state act wrongly if it took
measures to ensure that PMC(b) will be inculcated in the younger generation? Our
intention is to answer this question by describing three basic positions that might be
taken with regard to PMC(a) and PMC(b). This typology will show more fully the
importance of making a distinction between the two interpretations of the principle
of mutual consent, and therefore also the importance of distinguishing LSE(a) and
LSE(b).
First, one may take the position that PMC(a) should be accepted as part of the
public morality, while PMC(b) should be rejected as a private morality. Someone
holding this position will respect the right of all citizens to arrange their sexual lives
according to their own values and preferences, but will dismiss the view that there
can be nothing morally wrong with consensual sex. To be sure, embracing PMC(a)
as part of the public morality implies rejecting any private morality that does not
consider valid consent as a necessary condition for any form of sex to be morally
unobjectionable. Defending the view that non-consensual sex may be morally right
is inconsistent with supporting the view that no one is allowed to violate the
individual right of sexual self-determination. But endorsing PMC(a) as a component
of public morality is quite compatible with supporting a private morality that does
not take valid consent as a sufficient condition for morally irreproachable sex. This
is exactly the position we are talking about: PMC(b) is rejected as a private morality
because valid consent is considered not enough for making the sex morally all right.
Other conditions should also be fulfilled in order to make the sex morally unobjec-
tionable—for example that the sexual partners are married, or have a loving





































































58 J. Steutel & B. Spiecker
David Carr (1998) is an example of someone who takes this position. On the basis
of an ideal of human sexual flourishing and sexual virtuousness, he regards homo-
sexuality, auto-eroticism and heterosexual promiscuity as morally reprehensible
self-abusive vices. Nonetheless he opposes the view that the state should have the
authority to enforce his virtue–ethical theory: ‘liberals are entirely correct in discern-
ing that constraint and criminalization is appropriate only in cases of sexual conduct
which clearly violate the safety and well-being of others’ (p. 182). In other words, he
rejects PMC(b) in favour of some ideal of personal perfection, regards this view as
a private morality, and accepts PMC(a) as part of the public morality. As we
suggested above, orthodox religious believers, including orthodox Muslims, may
also be examples of the position at issue. Although being an orthodox believer
involves accepting the truth of some revelation and its authorized interpretations,
such an attitude may go hand in hand with accepting the right of citizens to arrange
their lives, and therefore also their sexual conduct, according to quite different
views, including PMC(b).
It is important to note, however, that the position we are talking about should be
taken as a moral position, which implies that PMC(a) should be regarded as part of
the public morality for moral reasons. Sometimes orthodox Islamic spokesmen seem
to appeal only to instrumental or pragmatic reasons when proclaiming that all
Muslims who are living in the Netherlands should accept liberal-democratic public
morality, for example when they argue that opposing liberal-democratic principles
will put their community in a bad light or may generate negative or even repressive
reactions. But the fact that orthodox believers offer non-moral reasons for accepting
PMC(a) as part of public morality does not, of course, exclude the possibility that
they could have given a moral justification as well. That this possibility is far from
purely hypothetical may be recognized if it is understood that such moral reasons
need not be akin to the moral justifications offered by liberal philosophers, like an
appeal to the principle of respect for persons, to the value of personal autonomy, or
to the criterion of reciprocity as a basis of political legitimacy. As Rawls (1987) has
pointed out in his explanation of the idea of an overlapping consensus, different and
incompatible moral and religious doctrines may have in themselves the moral re-
sources to support the public morality of a liberal democracy. For example, some
orthodox Muslims argue that the just and good society prescribed by the Koran
actually supports equality of men and women, as well as freedom of choice in
matters of faith and religion (cf. Rawls, 1999, p. 151). In a similar way orthodox
religious believers may sustain PMC(a) as part of the public morality on the basis of
reasons derived from their private moral views. David Carr, for example, justifies
mutual tolerance, including tolerance with regard to forms of consensual sex which
he considers morally wrong, by appealing to Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians:
‘for, as the Apostle has taught, even if a firm faith that ours is the true way has given
us sure hope of salvation, we are nothing if we have not love’ (1998, p. 182).
A second position consists in supporting PMC(a) as a component of the public
morality and accepting PMC(b) as a private sexual morality. This is the position of
the full-blooded liberal, who not only holds the view that all citizen should have the
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also believes that there is nothing morally wrong with any form of sex which is
validly consented to. It is quite conceivable that orthodox religious believers will
reject PMC(a) as a public sexual morality on the basis of their moral-religious views,
although such views, as we noted above, may also provide the moral grounds for
accepting PMC(a) as a public principle. But it is hard to conceive that someone who
endorses PMC(b) as a private sexual morality could reject PMC(a) as part of the
public morality. Indeed, PMC(b), taken as a private morality, can only offer reasons
for accepting and never for opposing PMC(a) as a public principle. In this respect,
the person who endorses PMC(b) as a private principle, compared with those who
are committed to other private sexual moralities, is the most reliable supporter of the
right of the state to make sure that nobody’s sexual freedom is violated. Moreover,
an interesting asymmetry can be pointed out in the mutual moral attitude of the
full-blooded liberal and the person who accepts the first position. The latter will not
only disagree with the view of the full-blooded liberal, but also morally condemn
certain sexual practices which are in keeping with that liberal view, particularly those
forms of consensual sex that do not meet his or her additional criteria of morally
irreproachable sex. The full-blooded liberal for his or her part will reject the private
sexual morality of the person who takes the first position. But he or she will not
morally condemn any sexual practice which conforms to that view.
A third position that could be discerned consists in rejecting both PMC(b) as a
private morality and PMC(a) as a part of the public morality. Typical of this position
is that some moral view on sexuality, which should be seen as private from a
liberal-democratic perspective, is defended and presented as something that should
be part of the public morality. It is regrettable that leading figures of Muslim groups
and representatives of orthodox Christian communities are not always clear about
whether they embrace the first or rather this third position. For precisely on the basis
of this distinction the line can be drawn between orthodox religious believers who
are liberal on the political level and those who are fundamentalists. As we have
emphasized in our discussion of the first position, orthodox believers may see their
non-liberal views on human sexuality as a private morality and sustain a liberal
sexual public morality on the basis of both typical liberal-philosophical reasons and
reasons that are derived from their own moral-religious views. But if they want to
elevate their private non-liberal views into a public sexual morality, that is, as a view
that may be promoted by state policy and legislation, they become fundamentalists.
It is also regrettable that representatives of the Dutch government are obfuscating or
overlooking this distinction when calling Muslim leaders to account for their moral
condemnation of homosexual practices. Such a state intervention may be fully
legitimate if those leaders reject PMC(a) as a public morality and therefore take the
third position. But if they are endorsing the first position, such an intervention
would be inconsistent with the principles the state itself is supposed to defend,
especially with PMC(a). What the members of the Dutch government should have
done is to ask the Muslim leaders whether they are sympathetic to the first position
or rather opt for the third.
Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, not only orthodox religious believ-
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full-blooded liberal, who accepts PMC(b) but only as a private morality, persons
who subscribe to PMC(b) might want to give this principle a public status. Although
this position looks quite liberal, it actually is a kind of fundamentalism, or is at least
a view with a fundamentalist touch. For if PMC(b) is elevated to a public principle,
the public status of PMC(a) is in fact undermined if not denied. Surely because both
PMC(b) and PMC(a) only forbid forms of sex that are non-consensual, taking these
principles as part of the public morality would result in constraining a citizen’s
sexual behaviour in precisely the same way. In this respect, state policy that is
founded on PMC(b) would be as liberal as state policy that takes PMC(a) as its
basis. But it would be different in other important respects. Claiming that PMC(b)
should be part of the public morality implies giving the state the right to defend and
promote this principle, and this means that the state does have the authority not only
to ensure that all its citizens will attune their sexual behaviour to PMC(b), but also
to propagate PMC(b) and to oppose all moral views on sexuality that contradict it,
including the views of orthodox religious believers who take the first position. In this
particular respect, giving PMC(b) a public status is incompatible with accepting
PMC(a) as part of the public morality. For if PMC(a) is taken as a public principle,
the state is not allowed to oppose non-liberal sexual views that are merely held as
private moralities. On the contrary, the state would have the duty to respect these
views. Consequently, state officials who publicly admonish Muslim leaders who are
quite willing to accept PMC(a) as a public principle are guilty of doing something
that has a touch of fundamentalism, to say the least of it.
It will be clear now why the state does not have the right to prescribe LSE(b), that
is, a form of sex education that has PMC(b) as its moral content. Acceptance of
PMC(a) as a foundation of state policy and legislation involves giving the state the
right to prescribe a form of sex education that is only inconsistent with the
educational views and practices of parents and communities that are supporting the
third position, more particularly with educational views and practices which are
inspired by some form of fundamentalism. But if the state would take PMC(b) as a
basis of its policy and regulations, it would claim the right to prescribe a form of sex
education that also contravenes the educational views and practices of parents and
communities that are defending the first position. From a liberal-democratic point of
view, such a policy would be illegitimate.
Conclusions
In the introductory section we explained the distinction between a public and private
morality in terms of the right of the state to defend or promote particular principles
and virtues. Up to now we have only discussed which principles may be part of the
moral content of the form of sex education the state is allowed to prescribe. But
where are the virtues?
In some ethical theories, especially in theories that go by the name of ‘virtue
ethics’, virtues are regarded as traits of character that we, as human beings, have to
acquire in order to flourish or to live up to some ideal of human perfection (cf. Carr,
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however important they are, should be counted as private moralities. Consequently,
the state does not have the right to prescribe any form of sex education that is
informed or inspired by some virtue–ethical account of the sexual sphere of life.
Other ethical theories, in particular philosophical views that could be joined under
the name of ‘liberalism’, tend to regard those traits as virtues that we, as citizens, are
supposed to acquire for the purpose of a well-functioning and flourishing liberal
democracy (cf. White, 1996). As we said above, typical of a liberal democracy is that
its main political and social institutions are arranged according to Rawls’s first
principle of justice. And the traits that Rawls identifies as virtues are precisely the
traits of the citizen who is able and willing to sustain and uphold these basic
institutions (Rawls, 1993, pp. 194–195). We argued that PMC(a) is covered by
Rawls’s first principle of justice and therefore should be seen as part of the public
morality of a liberal democracy. This principle, too, corresponds with traits that are
to be regarded as civic virtues, especially the virtue of respect for the right of sexual
self-determination of one’s fellow citizens and the virtue of tolerance towards
legitimate sexual practices which one considers in some sense morally defective.
Precisely these civic virtues are the central aims of the kind of sex education the state
has the right to prescribe.
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